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Locating and Securing Use-After-Free Pointers
ABSTRACT
Dangling pointers and/or use-after-free pointers are gateways to exploits for software
such as browsers, operating systems, etc. To forestall attacks that rely on dangling or user-afterfree pointers, ordinary pointers in source code can be replaced by secure pointers. However,
rolling out code with such replacement requires the developer to incur testing and engineering
costs. Further, due to the likely memory and runtime overheads of secure pointers, it is useful to
identify ordinary pointers in source code that merit replacement. This disclosure describes
techniques to determine which ordinary pointers in source code are suitable for replacement by
secure pointers.
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BACKGROUND
When the memory for an object is deallocated, pointers to that object become invalid.
Such pointers, known as dangling pointers, can be exploited by attackers to cause undesirable or
malicious program behavior. A pointer that points to memory that has been reused (reallocated)
is known as a use-after-free pointer; these, too, are gateways to exploits.
A previous publication [1] described techniques to track pointers at runtime and
periodically test pointers to determine if they are pointing to deallocated or reallocated memory.
Another publication [2] described techniques to detect the presence of dangling and use-after-
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free pointers by augmenting pointer and pointed-to object with metadata that enables the
checking of the validity of the pointer and the reuse status of the memory it points to. In both
techniques, upon the discovery of dangling or use-after-free pointers, security breaches are
forestalled by causing a program crash, which may be a preferred option to leaving open the
potential for security breaches.
In both techniques, ordinary pointers are replaced by secure pointer classes that are
wrappers around ordinary pointers. For example, in [1], a pointer class SafePtr is defined that
encapsulates the ordinary pointer and an additional pointer to a linked-list that serves as a
pointer-tracking mechanism. In [2], a pointer class CheckedPtr is defined that encapsulates the
ordinary pointer and additional metadata to enable the checking of the validity of the pointer and
the reuse status of the memory it points to. In both techniques, ordinary pointers in the source
code are replaced selectively or globally by the new secure pointer classes.
In complex software, e.g., browsers, operating systems, etc., with thousands of modules
and perhaps tens of thousands of pointer variables, replacement of an ordinary pointer by a
SafePtr or a CheckedPtr would invariably involve testing and engineering costs. Although the

memory and runtime overheads and engineering costs of SafePtr and CheckedPtr are likely
modest, it is still useful to reduce overhead as much as possible. Not all ordinary pointers in
source code merit replacement. Optimally, only those ordinary pointers that are likely to become
dangling or use-after-free (and hence, sources of potential security breaches) need to be replaced
by the more secure SafePtr and CheckedPtr classes. However, it is difficult to know which
ordinary pointer stands as a gateway to a potential security breach.
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DESCRIPTION
This disclosure describes techniques to determine the ordinary pointers in source code
that are to be replaced by more secure pointer classes.

Fig. 1: Locating and securing use-after-free and dangling pointers

Fig. 1 illustrates locating and securing use-after-free and dangling pointers in production
(shipped) code, per the techniques of this disclosure. During normal usage of shipped software,
the occasional bug can cause a crash, which is usually accompanied by a crash report. Users are
provided with options to send such crash reports to the developer, who can analyze (102) the
reports to identify crashes that are caused by use-after-free or dangling pointers (104). For
example, crash reports can include data that enables such identification. Pointers that are
determined to have been the cause for crashes are replaced in the source code with equivalent
secure pointers (106), e.g., SafePtr or CheckedPtr in a subsequent version.
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CONCLUSION
Dangling pointers and/or use-after-free pointers are gateways to exploits for software
such as browsers, operating systems, etc. To forestall attacks that rely on dangling or user-afterfree pointers, ordinary pointers in source code can be replaced by secure pointers. However,
rolling out code with such replacement requires the developer to incur testing and engineering
costs. Further, due to the likely memory and runtime overheads of secure pointers are modest, it
is useful to identify ordinary pointers in source code that merit replacement. This disclosure
describes techniques to determine which ordinary pointers in source code are suitable for
replacement by secure pointers.
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